Dianne E. Ranne v. Department of the Treasury 01A32979 February 11, 2004 . Dianne E. Ranne, Complainant, v. John W. Snow, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency. Appeal No. 01A32979 Agency No. 01-2269 Hearing No. 310-A2-5052X DECISION Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final decision (FAD) by the agency dated July 28, 2003, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of the June 24, 2002 settlement agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405. The June 24, 2002 settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that: 1. The Bureau agrees; that upon receipt of the medical information from [Complainant's] psychologist and the Bureau's psychologist/psychiatrist which states that [Complainant's] phobia is resolved to the point that her emotional stability and level of anxiety would not be adversely affected by the presence of insects or crickets, regardless of the number of insects or crickets or the time spent around them, and that it would not reasonably interfere with her ability to concentrate or perform the duties and responsibilities of a police officer, it will non-competitively temporarily promote, not to exceed one year, [Complainant] to a police officer position (at the grade and step she was at the time she was last employed as BEP police officer). If [Complainant] successfully completes this one-year probationary period without incident or need of accommodation for her phobia, the Bureau will make her promotion permanent. 2. [Complainant] .......... d. Agrees to successfully complete and pass all physical and medical requirements of a police officer. .......... 3. [Complainant] acknowledges, understands and agrees that in the event that her psychologist or the Bureau's psychologist/psychiatrist do not definitively state that her phobia is resolved to the point that her emotional stability and level of anxiety would not be adversely affected by the presence of insects or crickets, regardless of the number of insects or crickets or the time spent around them, and that it would not reasonably interfere with her ability to concentrate or perform the duties and responsibilities of a police officer, or if she fails to pass the medical or physical requirements of a police officer, or fails to pass the firearm requirements of a police officer she will not be placed in the position of police officer. By letter to the agency dated April 3, 2003, complainant through her attorney, alleged that the agency breached the settlement agreement and requested that the agency implement the terms of the agreement by reinstating her to the position of a police officer. Specifically, complainant claimed that the agency breached the settlement agreement on February 5, 2003, when it determined that complainant would not be reinstated as a police officer because she failed the requisite hearing portion of the physical examination. Complainant further alleged that her hearing was the same as it was when she was initially hired by the agency as a police officer; and that despite her hearing impairment, she successfully completed her probationary period and performed her duties competently for the years of 1998, 1999 and 2000. Furthermore, complainant alleged that the agency acted in bad faith in settling her complaint. In its July 28, 2003 FAD, the agency found there was no breach. The agency determined that the language in provision 3 of the settlement agreement required complainant to undergo a physical examination in order to be a police officer. The agency further determined that because complainant failed the requisite audiometric test, she was not placed in the position of a police officer. The agency concluded that there was no evidence that any of the agency officials engaged in bad faith during negotiations of complainant's settlement agreement. Specifically, the agency concluded that complainant was represented by an attorney and that they had a reasonable period of time to consider the terms of the settlement agreement. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984). In the instant case, we find that the agency properly found no breach. Specifically, we find the language in provision 2.d. states that complainant agrees to successfully complete and pass all physical and medical requirements of a police officer. We also find the language in provision 3 states that if complainant fails to pass the medical or physical requirements of a police officer, she would not be placed in the position of police officer. Here, complainant failed the requisite hearing test which resulted in her not being placed in the position of a police officer. Additionally, complainant has failed to show that the agency engaged in bad faith or that she was misled during the negotiations of complainant's settlement agreement. Therefore, we find that the agency complied with the June 24, 2002 settlement agreement. Accordingly, the agency's final decision finding no settlement breach is hereby AFFIRMED. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0701) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations February 11, 2004 __________________ Date �
Tag Archives: rape
Ranne v. Department of the Treasury
Filed under Discrete Acts, Dismissals, Harassment, Hostile Work Environment
Turner v. Department of Defense
Janet Turner v. Department of Defense 01976791 November 16, 1998 Janet Turner, ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Appeal No. 01976791 ) Agency No. W97-11 William S. Cohen, ) Secretary, ) Department of Defense, ) (Defense Contract Audit Agency), ) Agency. ) ) DECISION The appellant timely filed an appeal with this Commission from a final decision, dated August 4, 1997, which the agency issued pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. §1614.107(a) and (b). The Commission accepts the appellant's appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended. The final agency decision defined two allegations raised by the appellant's June 17, 1997 complaint. The decision dismissed both allegations for failure to state a claim. The decision also dismissed allegation 1 for untimely EEO counselor contact. Appeal Contentions On appeal, the appellant's attorney contends that the appellant's untimely EEO contact should be excused because she was unaware of the 45-day time limit for EEO counselor contact. The attorney also contends that the time limit should be waived due to the appellant's reduced mental capacity from the post traumatic stress disorder caused by the action about which she complains in allegation 1. The attorney further contends that the appellant's allegations were timely because they included acts that were part of a continuing violation. In addition, the attorney contends that the appellant's complaint states a hostile work environment claim and a reasonable accommodation claim. In response, the agency submits evidence that the appellant received sexual harassment training in August 1994 and in July 1996 which included information on the 45-day time limitation for EEO counselor contact. The agency acknowledges that the appellant raised a third issue in her complaint. The agency represents the allegation was counseled as part of the appellant's second complaint (W97-12). Allegation 1 After a review of the entire record, including the appeal submissions of the parties, the Commission finds that the appellant's March 6, 1997 counselor contact was untimely as to allegation 1. The record demonstrates that the appellant received training on the 45-day time limitation in August 1994. She should have come forward at that time with allegation 1 (allegedly in 1993 a coworker raped the appellant in his apartment following an office party at another coworker's home). Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence in the record that the appellant was prevented from contacting an EEO counselor due to a lack of knowledge of what allegedly had occurred. This is not a case in which the individual did not remember a traumatic event. The appellant represents in an affidavit that during the year following the incident, she was very ashamed that a co-worker had been able to do something like this to her and she did not want anyone to know. She also represents that after the incident she kept trying to force herself not to think about it. She indicates that she later learned in counseling that she had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and was experiencing flashbacks, constantly reliving the incident in her head. Thus, even if the appellant did not believe until sometime in 1997 that what the coworker had done was rape, it appears that the appellant viewed the coworker's alleged actions in 1993 as unwelcome and inappropriate when they occurred. Furthermore, the appellant received training in what constitutes prohibited sexual harassment in August 1994. In addition, the appellant was able to perform her job during this time period, as evidenced by the promotion to a GS-12 Auditor position which she received in 1994. Given these facts, the Commission finds no basis for extending the time limitation for EEO counselor contact due to diminished mental capacity. The Commission finds no basis in the record for tolling the time limitation for EEO counselor contact based on a continuing violation theory because the appellant is not alleging that the coworker continued to make unwanted advances after the one incident in 1993. See generally, Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396, 402 (1st Cir. 1990) (a knowing plaintiff has an obligation to file promptly with the EEOC or lose his claim); Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hospital, 850 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (a claim arising out of an injury which is "continuing" only because a plaintiff knowingly fails to seek relief is exactly the sort of claim that Congress intended to bar by the limitations period). Accordingly, the Commission finds no basis in the record for extending the time limitation for EEO counselor contact regarding allegation 1. Given this finding, the Commission does not address the agency's alternative ground for dismissing allegation 1. Allegation 2 The Commission agrees with the agency that an allegation about a statement which allegedly the EEO counselor made on March 12, 1997, does not, in and of itself, state a claim of employment discrimination. Accordingly, the Commission affirms the agency's dismissal of this allegation. Allegations 3 and 4 The Commission agrees with the appellant's attorney that the appellant's complaint states the following hostile work environment and reasonable accommodation claims: (3) the presence in the appellant's workplace of the coworker who allegedly had raped her constitutes a hostile work environment for the appellant; and (4) the agency's alleged failure to protect the appellant from workplace contact with the coworker (preferably by transferring the coworker to another location) constitutes a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for the appellant's disability (PTSD). These issues were raised with the EEO counselor as evidenced by the EEO Counselor's Report. Because the agency has not addressed these allegations, the Commission remands the complaint to the agency for further processing. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's dismissal of allegations 1 and 2; REVERSES the agency's implicit dismissal of allegations 3 and 4; and REMANDS allegations 3 and 4 to the agency for processing as ORDERED below. ORDER The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §1614.108. If possible, the agency should consolidate the remanded allegations with the appellant's second complaint (W97-12). The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant that it has received the remanded allegations within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall issue to appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty (60) days of receipt of appellant's request. A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. §1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively, the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16© (Supp. V 1993). If the appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. §1614.410. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0795) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available when the previous decision was issued; or 2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law, regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or 3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial precedential implications. Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. §1614.407. All requests and arguments must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received by the Commission. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration, a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. §1614.604(c). RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993) This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: November 16, 1998 ______________ Date Ronnie Blumenthal, Director Office of Federal Operations
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Lowery v. Department of the Navy
Diane Lowery v. Department of the Navy 01982409; 01A10301 September 14, 2001 . Diane Lowery, Complainant, v. Gordon R. England, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency. Appeal Nos. 01982409; 01A10301 Agency Nos. DON-95-60042-001; DON-96-60036-012 Hearing Nos. 370-96-X2657; 370-97-X2822 DECISION Complainant timely initiated two appeals from two Final Agency Decisions (FAD) concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The appeals are accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405 and consolidated pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.606. Complainant alleges she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex (female) when: (1) she was sexually harassed by a Senior Chief, who later became her supervisor, when on September 11, 1995, he told her that she could lose her job if she did not cooperate with his suggestion that they could have some sexual fun together; and (2) when on September 19, 1995, the Senior Chief told her that she could lose her job if she did not loosen up while working at the bar and make her customers happy (Complaint No. 1). In addition, complainant alleges that she was discriminated on the bases of sex (female) and reprisal for her rejection of a co-worker's sexual advances when she was terminated on November 8, 1995 (Complaint No. 2). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decisions. Complainant initiated EEO contact on October 24, 1995 with respect to the first Complaint. She filed a formal Complaint on December 1, 1995. After an investigation was conducted, complainant requested a hearing which took place on January 16 and 21, 1997. At the time of the hearing, the agency was in the process of investigating the second EEO complaint filed by complainant concerning her November 1995 termination. While the administrative judge (AJ) suggested the possibility of holding the first complaint in abeyance so that both complaints could be consolidated at the hearing, both parties expressed the belief that a decision on the first complaint would lead to a settlement or withdrawal of the second complaint. Accordingly, the hearing went forward on the first complaint and the AJ issued a decision on October 31, 1997 finding no discrimination. Specifically, the AJ determined that complainant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was subjected to sexual harassment. With respect to the second complaint, the AJ dismissed the matter without a hearing concluding that her previous findings of fact served to bar complainant from proceeding to a hearing. The findings of fact which barred complainants claims were as follows. The AJ determined in the first hearing that: (1) Complainant did not prove that she was subjected to a sexual assault on September 11, 1995; (2) Complainant did not prove that the Senior Chief made sexually offensive comments to her on September 19, 1995; (3) Complainant contacted two agency officials about her allegations of sexual harassment after she received the October 13, 1995 Advanced Notice of Proposed Removal; and (4) Complainant did not report the alleged sexual harassment to her supervisor (S1). The agency issued two separate FADs on the complaints referenced above and found that complainant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that discrimination occurred. Complainant appealed each FAD. Complainant's Testimony: The AJ summarized complainant's testimony as follows. Complainant began her employment as a bartender at the Recreation Center at Concord Naval Weapons Station (CNWS) on September 11, 1995. Complainant testified that on that day, she was introduced to a Senior Chief (SC) (male) by a former bartender (W1) (female), who stated “this is the new bartender ... can you believe she has six children?” Complainant testified that SC helped W1 lift a heavy CO2 bottle, had a coke, and left the Recreation Center bar. Complainant also testified that W1 left shortly thereafter at approximately 12:30 p.m. According to complainant, at approximately 1:00 p.m., SC returned to the bar and asked where the liquor and condiments were kept. Complainant testified that although she did not understand SC to have any job responsibility involving the bar, she thought as Senior Chief he was planning on helping to “get the club going” for the men under his command. Complainant further testified that after she showed him the alcohol and condiments, he asked to see the laundry room. She testified that he walked into the room while she followed him and explained the use of the different linens. Complainant testified that SC asked her if she liked her job, and she responded that she did. Complainant also testified that SC said, “Would you like your job some more?” Complainant testified that when she asked what he meant, he backed up and closed the laundry room door with his left hand. Complainant testified that she again asked what he meant and he replied, “we could have some fun, if you would like.” When she responded that she”really [wasn't] into that at all,” he stated that “it would make it much better for you.” Complainant testified that she said, “no, I really don't think so.” Then, according to complainant, SC “poked [her] in the chest real hard” and said, “I think it would be advisable if you just loosen up and you are not so rigid.” She responded by saying, “you have got to be kidding me. What are you doing?” Complainant also testified that she asked him to take his hand off the door which he was apparently blocking. Complainant testified that she tried to lift his hand off the door but was unable to do so. She testified that she said, “I really think you ought to leave open the door so I can get out of here” and that he poked her in the chest two times “real hard.” She testified that he then said, “just loosen up,” and that he “ripped at the top of [her] blouse.” She further testified that SC then started opening her pants. According to complainant, he forced her pants open and then took his penis out. Complainant testified that SC penetrated her and ejaculated. According to complainant, after the sexual assault, SC threatened to kill her if she told anyone and that “[her] kids [were] going to find [her] dead.” He then left the laundry room. She testified that she “laid down on the floor” for fifteen to twenty minutes. She then grabbed a rag, closed her pants, and left the room. She testified that she went to the bar, got some bleach or disinfectant, and attempted to clean herself up in the bathroom. She then put on a long white sweater jacket to cover up her ripped shirt and bleached pants. According to complainant, she worked the rest of her shift after the assault. She testified that she contemplated calling security or the base captain but decided that SC would learn of her report. She then decided she would report SC but only for sexual harassment since, as she testified, “he cannot kill me for that.” According to her testimony, complainant then attempted to reach her supervisor (S1) (male) on the same day as the assault. She testified that after three tries she reached him and told him that “the Senior Chief had come in and he tried to seduce [her] and sexually harass her. It was terrible ... [she couldn't] believe this [was] happening.” Complainant testified that she did not give any details but that S1 told her to calm down and that he would take care of it. Complainant further testified that on the same day as the assault, she called a former co-worker, (W2) (male) and told him that she was having problems with “this chief” who had sexually harassed her. Complainant testified that she called W2 again that night and told him that she thought she was “doing better” and that she was “going to try to put this out of [her] mind.” According to complainant, W2 opposed that idea and confirmed that she had told her immediate supervisor about the “harassment.” Complainant further testified that the night of the assault she told her son that she had been “seduced.” Complainant testified that on the following day she went to work and saw SC. SC was upset over the recission of the “free soda policy” for on-duty security. She also testified that SC told her that some customers had complained about her “hostility” and “rudeness” the night before when she had tried to close the bar at 12:30 a.m. (the appropriate time). Complainant also testified that she spoke again with S1 on September 12, 1995. She testified that she called S1 to discuss the free soda policy and also asked him if anything was being done about SC. According to complainant, S1 stated that “it is being handled. Don't you worry about it.” Complainant testified that she did not see SC again until September 19, 1995. On that date, according to complainant, S1 entered the bar with SC and told her they needed to have a meeting with her. At that time, S1 told her that he was leaving Concord Naval Weapons Station and that SC was becoming her new supervisor. S1 also told her that he had received complaints from customers about her, including a claim that she had been found sleeping on the job. Complainant testified that she expressed shock that S1 had come in with SC and that she asked right in front of SC, “[S1], what are you going to do about SC and what happened?” Complainant testified that S1 put his hand in front of her mouth and said, “we are not going to discuss it now.” Then, in spite of her protests, S1 left without SC. Complainant further testified that SC then reiterated that she needed to “loosen up” and “make these guys happy” and that if she did not do so, “it could wind up into where we get the whole security force after [her] into a gang bang.” Complainant testified that she told SC to “get the ‘F' out of here” and then tried to call S1 again. Complainant testified that she was unable to contact S1 so she called W2 and told him that her current supervisor was doing nothing to address the problem that the harasser was going to be her new boss. Complainant also testified that the next day (September 20, 1995) she called the base chaplain's office. According to complainant, she left a message with a male secretary. The chaplain called her on September 22, and complainant testified that she told him she was being “very badly sexually harassed” and mentioned the name of her harasser. Complainant testified that the chaplain told her to contact the EEO office on base. Complainant further testified that sometime prior to September 26, 1995, she strained her arm dragging some wet styrofoam mats out of the bar. She eventually filled a worker's compensation claim and had to take time off from work beginning on or about September 26, 1995. While she was out on leave, she received an Advanced Notice of Proposed Removal dated October 13, 1995. The Notice was signed by SC. Complainant testified that she spoke to the chaplain two more times after her termination (once shortly after she lost her job and once before the EEO investigation. She also testified that she hand-delivered a letter regarding the sexual harassment to the Executive Officer (XO) (female) prior to September 26, 1995 and later mailed a certified/return receipt letter to XO after complainant received the Advanced Notice of Proposed Removal. Complainant presented three witnesses to corroborate her version of events. Her two sons, ages 21 and 26, both testified that their mother became depressed, reclusive and irritable in mid-September, 1995. One son testified that his mother told him that a chief sexually harassed her and it some how involved the laundry room. Complainant also presented the testimony of a psychologist (P1) under whose care she has been since September 20, 1996. P1 testified that he was the first person to whom complainant revealed the actual sexual assault. P1 testified that after two sessions and a series of psychological tests, he formed the opinion that complainant was telling the truth about having been raped by SC. S1 testified that complainant never informed him of the September 11, 1995 incident. He further generally denied everything testified by complainant that related to her informing him of sexual harassment. The chaplain testified that according to his October 1995 telephone bill, the first time he spoke with complainant was on October 21, 1995. He testified that she did relate something along the lines of a sexual assault or harassment. He also testified that she did name SC as her harasser. The chaplain testified that he did not speak with complainant in September 1995. W1 testified that she introduced SC to complainant in September, 1995. She further testified that she did not know that complainant had any children. In addition, W1 testified that the diagram of the laundry room entered as an exhibit did not accurately reflect the position of the washer and dryer which were in actuality pushed up against the back wall in the left corner, leaving several feet between the door and the washer and dryer. XO testified that she did not learn of complainant's sexual harassment allegations until the chaplain came to her office on October 23, 1995 and told her about his call with complainant. She further testified that she called S1 at that time and asked if he had been informed of complainant's allegations, to which he responded in the negative. XO also testified that complainant hand-delivered a letter with complainant's responses to the intent to remove her around October 24, 1995. XO also testified that she received via base mail complainant's appeal to the Notice of Removal. SC testified that he met complainant on September 11, 1995 when they were introduced by W1. SC testified that W1 did not mention that complainant had any children. SC further testified that he ate his lunch in the recreation center and then returned to his office. He denied returning to the recreation center at any time on September 11, 1995. SC also generally denied all of complainant's allegations that he sexually assaulted or harassed her. SC also corroborated S1's testimony that he left with S1 after their meeting with complainant on September 19, 1995. W2 declined to testified at the hearing. AJ's Findings and Conclusions The AJ determined that complainant's witnesses corroborated a finding that complainant did not make up the sexual harassment allegations after she received notice of her proposed removal. However, because complainant's witnesses' testimony was vague and lacked specificity, the AJ found that these witnesses did not corroborate complainant's claim that she was sexually assaulted. With respect to the rape allegation, the AJ noted that complainant failed to tell anyone about the rape until more than a year after the incident. While P1 concluded that complainant was telling the truth, as the agency counsel pointed out, P1 never spoke to SC, S1, XO, or the chaplain, or considered any other evidence which contradicts complainant's versions of events. Furthermore, the AJ found “disturbing inconsistencies in [complainant's] story.” For example, the AJ noted that at one point in the hearing, she testified that after SC left the laundry room following the attack, she “laid down on the floor” for fifteen to twenty minutes. Shortly thereafter, complainant testified that she did not lay down but rather sat there. In addition, in her affidavit testimony complainant stated that she went into the laundry room first and SC was in back of her. However, at the hearing complainant testified that SC went into the laundry room first. In her affidavit testimony, complainant testified that she left the laundry room first and went to the bar to use the phone as SC came out. At the hearing, complainant testified that she remained in the laundry room for fifteen to twenty minutes after he left. The AJ noted that complainant admits that there are inconsistencies between her affidavit and her hearing testimony but contends that these contradictions flow naturally from her desire to conceal the rape because of SC's threats on her life. However, the AJ found that complainant's affidavit does not merely leave out the assault from an otherwise accurate portrayal of the events of September 11, 1995. Rather, according to the AJ, complainant's affidavit testimony contains some blatant errors. For example, complainant stated in her affidavit that SC came out to the bar, grabbed her arm and said, “you have just lost your job,” to which she replied, “no, you have just lost your job, whatever it is.” According to complainant's hearing testimony, this exchange did not take place at all. In addition, complainant's testimony regarding her September, 1995 attempts to give management notice of the sexual harassment is uncorroborated by her own witnesses and contradicted by the agency witnesses. Accordingly, the AJ determined that the preponderance of the evidence strongly suggests that complainant did not tell any management official of the alleged sexual harassment until after October 20, 1995, when she received the Advance Notice of Proposed Removal. Thus, the AJ determined that, management had no opportunity to take appropriate remedial action prior to complainant's leaving the work place due to her injury and subsequent termination. The AJ noted that the agency cannot be held liable for any sexual harassment which occurred prior to September 19, 1995 (the day complainant learned SC was to be her new supervisor) because SC had no apparent or actual authority over complainant which he used to further any alleged harassment. While complainant also testified that SC made sexually offensive comments to her on September 19, 1995 after she learned that SC was to be her new boss, the AJ concluded that the preponderance of the record does not establish that SC made the alleged sexually offensive comments. The AJ noted that both SC and S1 testified that they left the meeting on September 19, 1995 together. The AJ noted in her decision that complainant faced a very difficult task in attempting to prove that a man with an apparently impeccable prior record committed a violent sexual assault on a woman he had just met and under very risky circumstances. Complainant's obstacles of proof are compounded by her failure to report the alleged assault to anyone until more than a year later or to preserve any physical evidence. Furthermore, the AJ found complainant's testimony “rife with internal inconsistencies, and her account of relevant post-assault events is uniformly refuted by the testimony of S1, SC, XO and the chaplain. In addition, the AJ found that complainant never provided a wholly satisfactory explanation for why she feared violent retaliation from SC if she reported the assault, but not if she claimed he had sexually harassed her. Accordingly, based upon the evidence before her, the AJ concluded that complainant failed to prove her claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Complaint No. 2 With respect to complainant's second complaint, the AJ granted the agency's motion to dismiss the complaint without a hearing because the AJ's prior findings of fact served to bar complainant from proceeding to a hearing since the second complaint alleged she was terminated due to her resistance to SC's harassment and/or in retaliation for having complained of the harassment to her supervisors. The AJ noted that she made the following factual findings: (1) Complainant did not prove that she was subjected to a sexual assault at the hands of SC on September 11, 1995; (2) Complainant did not prove that SC made sexually offensive comments to her on September 19, 1995; (3) Complainant contacted the chaplain and XO about her allegations of sexual harassment after complainant received the October 13, 1995 Advanced Notice of Proposed Removal; and (4) Complainant did not report the alleged sexual harassment to S1. With regard to any claim that complainant was terminated in retaliation for having complained of SC's harassment to S1, the chaplain, and XO, the AJ concluded that she previously found that complainant did not complain to any of these individuals until after she received the proposed notice of termination. Accordingly, the facts preclude a finding of retaliation. With respect to complainant's claim that SC (after becoming her supervisor in October 1995) terminated her because she refused his advances, the AJ concluded that the testimony at the January 1997 hearing indicated that S1, not SC, initiated the removal action for complainant. While complainant contends that the identity of the person responsible for firing complainant is still in dispute, the AJ concluded that resolution of this issue is not necessary for her to find that complainant is collaterally estopped from litigating the quid pro quo issue. The AJ determined that in the January1997 hearing, complainant had a chance to fully and fairly litigate her claim that SC had sexually harassed her in September 1995. According to the AJ, complainant did not prove that the alleged sexual assault and the related sexual comments occurred on September 11, 1995, nor that SC made sexual comments to her on September 19, 1995.<1> While complainant testified that some contact with SC occurred on September 12, 1995, she failed to claim that any sexually inappropriate conduct took place on that date. The AJ concluded that since the issue of sexual harassment has been fully and fairly litigated, and being that complainant failed to prove that she was sexually harassed, the AJ found that complainant cannot proceed on her quid pro quo claim, regardless of the fact that the issue of who made the decision to terminate her has not been adjudicated. The Agency adopted the findings and conclusions of the AJ in its FADs. The complainant argues on appeal that the credibility of the agency's witnesses is severely undermined by substantial inconsistencies. Furthermore the complainant argues that the only conclusion to be drawn from these inconsistencies is that the agency officials were attempting to cover up the truth. Specifically, complainant contends, inter alia, that S1 and SC contradict each other in their testimony regarding whose decision it was to terminate complainant. Complainant noted that SC testified that S1 wrote the proposal letter of termination and left it on the middle of SC's desk for him to sign on his first day in the new position. SC testified that he then faxed the letter to the Bureau of Personnel in Washington, D.C. for review. He received it back with some modifications, retyped it and sent it to complainant. S1, however, testified that he wrote the proposal letter and faxed it to the Bureau of Personnel in Washington, D.C. before he left his job on September 30, 1995. The Bureau of Personnel had not sent it back before September 30, 1995. He put it in a locked file and specifically informed SC that he had sent it to the Bureau of Personnel and they would be sending it back to SC. Complainant contends that this inconsistency indicates that S1 and SC are lying. Moreover, complainant argues that the circumstantial evidence makes it very unlikely that S1 had anything to do with the proposal letter. In addition, complainant contends that S1 testimony indicates that he was unfamiliar with the contents of the removal letter. S1 also testified that he had not personally observed complaints about complainant's performance. Rather, he testified that his removal letter was based on complaints he had received from others (XO and SC). S1 even testified that XO came to the bar several times and had seen complainant working. However, XO and SC both testified that neither of them had observed complainant working, nor had they complained to S1 about her. Accordingly, complainant argues that she was terminated for conduct that S1 never witnessed but claims to have learned from XO and SC, yet XO and SC never witnessed complainant's performance. In addition, complainant points out that she had only worked two weeks before injuring herself, and notes that it is extremely unusual for any employee to be terminated after such a short time. Complainant also argues on appeal that agency witnesses contradict each other in their testimony as to when they discovered the allegations of sexual harassment. Specifically, complainant notes that S1 testified that the first time he heard anything about the sexual harassment allegations was when the EEO counselor contacted him, in about December 1995. Yet XO testified that as soon as the chaplain called her about complainant's allegations, which was prior to the EEO complaint filing, she called S1 to ask him about his knowledge of the allegations. Similarly, SC testified that he heard about the allegations for the first time from the EEO counselor. SC stated that XO was not allowed to discuss the allegations with him. XO testified that she first heard of the allegations from the chaplain. XO testified that she did not receive any letter from complainant dealing with the sexual harassment allegations. However, XO testified in her affidavit that she thought the letter was addressed to her and not to SC. Complainant argues that the only letter addressed to XO was the letter raising the allegations of sexual harassment and accordingly, XO must have received such letter instead of the letter responding to the proposed removal. Complainant also asserts the SC's testimony about when he learned of the alleged rape cannot be true since complainant's counsel did not inform anyone of that fact until a later date. Complaint also argues that based upon the chaplain's testimony it is likely that he first spoke to her in September, 1995 rather than October 1995. The chaplain testified in his affidavit that he believed the telephone call to him occurred “shortly” after the September 11, 1995 incident. The chaplain mention nothing about a removal but did mention hearing about an incident of sexual harassment involving SC. Complainant asserts that if the chaplain's first conversation with complainant occurred after she had received the proposed termination, he certainly would have remembered discussing the proposed termination. Similarly, if the chaplain had been aware of the proposed termination, his discussion with XO would have included a discussion about the termination, however, XO testified that they discussed the sexual advances allegedly made by SC and there was no testimony that they discussed the termination. Complainant asserts that these facts prove that the chaplain was not aware of the termination after his first discussion with complainant. Complainant also alleges that the inconsistencies in her testimony were minor and should not have been a basis for discrediting her entire testimony. Analysis and Findings Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's decision summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws with respect to her sexual harassment and reprisal claims. While we agree with complainant's assertions that there are a number of inconsistencies between the agency witnesses, we nevertheless, find substantial evidence in the record to uphold the AJ's findings of fact. We simply find that the AJ had a sufficient basis to conclude that complainant was not credible. In addition, while there may be ample reasons to also find the agency witnesses not credible with respect to the reasons for complainant's termination and perhaps when they were advised of the alleged harassment<2>, a finding that the agency witnesses were also not credible does not change the fact that complainant also lacked credibility. Since complainant has the burden of proof, the AJ's finding that complainant was not credible is sufficient in this matter to preclude a finding of discrimination. In addition, given the fact that the AJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we agree with the AJ's determination that complainant could not prevail on her claims of sexual harassment and reprisal when she was terminated on November 8, 1995 (Complaint No. 2), since an essential element of each claim was previously litigated and resolved against complainant. Specifically, a complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of her protected activity; (3) subsequently, she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000). At the 1997 hearing the AJ determined that the agency was not aware of complainant's protected activity before the decision was made to terminate her. Since we find that this conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, we agree with the AJ that complainant could not make out a prima facie case of reprisal. With respect to the allegation that SC terminated complainant in response to her rejection of his sexual advances, Quid pro quo harassment is shown when submission to or rejection of unwelcome sexual conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual. 29 C.F.R. §1604.11 (a)(2); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 40 EPD 36,159 (1986); Newells v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01973359 (September 10, 1999). Accordingly, complainant must be able to prove two elements: (1) that unwelcome sexual conduct took place; and (2) a casually connected employment decision was made. Since the AJ issued a factual finding, which was supported by substantial evidence in the record, that unwelcome sexual conduct was not proven, we agree with the AJ that complainant could not prove the first essential element of her qui pro quo harassment allegation. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the Commission discerns no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions on appeal, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency final decisions. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0701) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations September 14, 2001 __________________ Date 1 The AJ noted that complainant's last face-to-face contact with SC was on September 19, 1995. 2 However, we find insufficient basis to discredit the chaplain's testimony that he first spoke to complainant in October 1995, given his consistent testimony and the fact that he produced a telephone bill indicating when his first call to complainant took place.
Filed under Harassment, Hostile Work Environment, Sexual Harassment
Shofield v. Department of the Army
Genevieve S. Schofield, Complainant, v. John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. Appeal No. 0120131039 Agency No. ARHOOD12OCT04045 DECISION Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the Agency's decision dated November 14, 2012, dismissing her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Contact Representative at the MEB Clinic, Darnall Army Medical Center, Fort Hood, Texas. On October 4, 2012, Complainant (female) contacted an Agency EEO counselor and alleged that she had been sexually harassed the previous day by the Lead Health System Specialist ("Employee F") (male). Complainant alleged that she went into his office to offer him some candy from her desk. The door to the office remained opened. She said that Employee F stood up, took the candy, hugged her and then deliberately grabbed her right breast with his hand. Complainant said she immediately slapped his back and said, "what the hell, not cool, not Ok." She alleged that he replied, "What? You put it there." Complainant later explained that she was particularly affected by this incident because she had been the victim of a rape as a teenager. After she sought EEO counseling, the EEO office informed the Commander of the incident, who assigned the Provost Marshal to deal with it. Complainant was instructed by the Provost Marshal to report the incident to the military police. She did as instructed and later provided a statement to a criminal investigator. On October 5, 2012, Complainant said she was approached by her supervisor and informed that Employee F was being moved to another work area and had been given a "no contact" order. Complainant asserts that the supervisor never asked her if she was alright, but instead let her know that she did not appreciate having to hear about the incident from "legal" instead of from Complainant. Complainant further asserts that Employee F was not, in fact, immediately moved and continued to be in the her vicinity until she complained about his presence in the clinic to the Major.1 The Agency also claims that Complainant was referred to the Fort Hood Sexual Harassment Assault Response Program (SHARP) officer. On October 30, 2012, when the matter was not resolved in counseling, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint concerning the incident alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. On November 14, 2012, the Agency issued a final decision dismissing the complaint, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1), for failure to state a claim. Specifically, the Agency found that, "[s]exual assault is not under the purview of EEO [complaint process]." The instant appeal followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.103, .106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994). When the complainant does not allege he or she is aggrieved within the meaning of the regulations, the agency shall dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1). In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that where, as is the case here, a complaint does not challenge an agency action or inaction regarding a specific term, condition or privilege of employment, a claim of harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment. The Court explained that an "objectively hostile or abusive work environment [is created when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive" and the complainant subjectively perceives it as such. Harris, at 21-22. Applying this case law, we conclude that the Agency erred in concluding that Complainant failed to state a viable claim of sexual harassment that requires further investigation and processing in the 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 EEO complaint process. Regardless of whether Complainant used the term "sexual harassment" or "sexual assault," the alleged action, if proven true, was sufficiently severe to state a viable claim of sexual harassment. In its brief submitted in response to this appeal, the Agency argues both that the criminal investigation of the incident was inconclusive and that management took prompt and effective action to deal with the situation. In making these arguments, the Agency is addressing the merits of the complaint without a proper investigation as required by the Part 1614 regulations. These arguments are irrelevant to the procedural issue of whether Complainant has presented a justiciable claim under Title VII. See Osborne v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05960111 (July 19, 1996); Lee v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05930220 (August 12, 1993); Ferrazzoli v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910642 (August 15, 1991). Accordingly, the Agency's final decision dismissing Complainant's complaint is REVERSED. The complaint is hereby REMANDED to the Agency for further processing in accordance with this decision and the Order below. ORDER (E0610) The Agency is ordered to process the remanded claim in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108 et seq. The Agency shall acknowledge to the Complainant that it has received the remanded claims within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The Agency shall issue to Complainant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify Complainant of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise resolved prior to that time. If the Complainant requests a final decision without a hearing, the Agency shall issue a final decision within sixty (60) days of receipt of Complainant's request. A copy of the Agency's letter of acknowledgment to Complainant and a copy of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0610) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610) This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations May 23, 2013 __________________ Date 1 In its brief in response to the Complainant's appeal, the Agency concedes that, despite the no-contact order, there were several situations during this period where Complainant and Employee F were in the same room, but asserts there was no contact between them. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0120131039 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 2 0120131039
Filed under Harassment, Hostile Work Environment, Sexual Harassment
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National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
536 US 101, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 – Supreme Court, 2002 – Google Scholar
… Thus, “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and … Title VII,
including those alleging discrimination by being subjected to a hostile working environment. …
between claims based on discrete acts and claims based on hostile work environments. …
Cited by 5251 How cited Related articles All 3 versions Cite Save
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson
477 US 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 – Supreme Court, 1986 – Google Scholar
… she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on … 2d 1193, 1197-1199
(CA8 1981) (holding employer liable for racially hostile working environment based on … on the
other hand, seeks backpay on the theory that a hostile work environment effected a …
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Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
510 US 17, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 – Supreme Court, 1993 – Google Scholar
… conditions of employment” as the law, the test is not whether work has been impaired, but whether
working conditions have been … may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.” The critical …
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Faragher v. Boca Raton
524 US 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 – Supreme Court, 1998 – Google Scholar
… 1352 (CA4 1995) (holding employer vicariously liable in part based on finding that the supervisor’s
rape of employee … 1992) (nursing 796 assistant raped patient … An employer is subject to vicarious
liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by …
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Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
524 US 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 – Supreme Court, 1998 – Google Scholar
… in the academic literature, see C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979 … 17,
21 (1993) (actionable sexual harassment occurs when the workplace is “permeated … an adverse
employment consequence, such as firing or demotion, or a hostile work environment. …
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
523 US 75, 118 S. Ct. 998, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 – Supreme Court, 1998 – Google Scholar
… and Lyons also physically assaulted Oncale in a sexual manner, and Lyons threatened him with
rape. … I felt that if I didn’t leave my job, that I would be raped or forced to … hostile or abusive work
environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive …
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BURLINGTON N. & SFR CO. v. White
547 US __, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 – Supreme Court, 2006 – Google Scholar
… her immediate supervisor, Bill Joiner, had repeatedly told her that women should not be working
in the … constructive discharge doctrine); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 (1993) (hostile
work environment doctrine). … “The real social impact of workplace behavior often …
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Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
491 US 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 – Supreme Court, 1989 – Google Scholar
… body of evidence [before Congress] pointing to the mistreatment of Negroes by private individuals
and unofficial groups, mistreatment unrelated to any hostile state legislation.” Id … These working
conditions included the use of the whip as an incentive to work harder — the …
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Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders
542 US 129, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 159 L. Ed. 2d 204 – Supreme Court, 2004 – Google Scholar
… and can be regarded as an aggravated case of, sexual harassment or hostile work environment.
For an atmosphere of sexual harassment or hostility to be actionable, we … A hostile-environment
constructive discharge claim entails something more: A plaintiff who advances such …
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Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co.
50 F. 3d 428 – Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, 1995 – Google Scholar
… A month later she was assigned to work for Michael Hall, the newly hired Western … On one side
lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which … It is not a bright
line, obviously, this line between a merely unpleasant working environment on the …
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